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I. INTRODUCTION

The burden of Guyana's public debt has for several decades acted as one
of the main impediments to poverty reduction and economic growth. This was
recognized by the international community in December 1997 when the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank decided that Guyana's
external debt was unsustainable and thus that Guyana was eligible for debt
relief under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (-IPC) Initiative. Since then,
Guyana has received debt relief totalling $560.9 million (U.S.) within the
context of the original and the enhanced HIPC initiatives implying a reduction

in debt stocks of fifty-four percent.'
Debt relief operations are a tricky business, however. In particular, there
will always be a temptation for so-called "rogue" creditors not to participate
in debt relief operations and instead try to ensure that the resources made
available as a result of debt relief from other creditors are used to repay their
debts. In other words, there is a danger that unless all creditors participate in
the debt relief operation, it simply deteriorates into a transfer of resources from
one creditor to another whilst not actually benefiting the debtor country itself.
Guyana was faced with this kind of situation recently when one of its
commercial creditors-the Big Food Group, based in the United Kingdom--refused to participate in the H!PC initiative and instead resorted to
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I Press Release, International Monetary Fund, IMF and World Bank Support US$334
Million Additional Debt Relief for Guyana (Dec. 19, 2003), available at http:/Hwww.imf.org/
extemal/np/sec/pr/2003/pr03224.htm.
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litigation in an attempt to recover its claim in full. Although not the first HIPC
country to be faced with the threat of litigation, Guyana's plight drew the
attention of international media and pressure groups, as well as the Bretton
Woods institutions, for the way in which it highlighted some of the inherent
contradictions of the HIPC initiative. This Comment will attempt to outline
some of the issues raised by arbitration proceedings between the Big Food
Group and the Government of Guyana, as well as make some tentative
recommendations. Prior to that, however, it will briefly outline the origin and
current status of Guyana's external debt burden.
II. BACKGROUND TO GUYANA'S EXTERNAL DEBT SITUATION

Guyana's indebtedness can be traced back to the oil crisis of the 1970s,
when rising oil prices adversely affected the balance of payments, forcing
Guyana to begin borrowing from abroad to finance imports. By the mid 1990s,
Guyana had become one of the world's most heavily indebted countries, with
an external debt burden exceeding $2 billion (U.S.) in 1995, equivalent to
more than three times its official GDP.2
The increasing awareness among developed countries of the
unsustainability of third world debt levels led the G7 group of countries to
launch in 1996, at the initiative of the World Bank and the IMF, the HIPC
Initiative to provide a comprehensive solution to the high debt levels in many
of the world's developing countries.3 Under the terms of the HIPC initiative,
all creditors are required to provide debt relief based on an equitable burdensharing approach. Possibly even more important than the debt relief itself,
however, is the requirement that HIPC countries carry out important economic,
political, and social reforms aimed at improving the development framework
as a prerequisite for the delivery of debt relief.
Guyana, which had already benefited from substantial debt relief from its
Paris Club bilateral creditors in 1996, became the first country to qualify for
debt relief under the so-called "fiscal window" of the HIPC initiative when it
reached its decision point in December 1997. Under the "fiscal window,"
Guyana's debt was judged to be unsustainable due to the fiscal burden of its
external debt with the net present value (NPV) of external debt to central

2

Bank of Guyana, External Public Debt, availableathttp:llwww.bankofguyana.org.gy/Sb7-

5.htm.
' For details about the HIPC initiative, see the World Bank's HIPC website at www.
worldbank.org/hipc.
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government revenue amounting to more than 450 percent in 1996." After the
implementation of key structural reforms and the agreement of a new threeyear program with the IMF, Guyana reached the completion point of the HIPC
initiative in May 1999, which paved the way for the delivery of NPV $256
million (U.S.) in debt relief from its creditors considered necessary to reduce
Guyana's external debt-to-revenue ratio to 280 percent.
Following a major review of the HIPC Initiative in 1999, a new enhanced
HIPC framework was launched which, in Guyana's case, aimed to lower the
external debt-to-revenue ratio to 250 percent. Guyana qualified for debt relief
under the enhanced HIPC initiative in November 2000 and finally reached its
completion point on December 18, 2003, after the completion of a full Poverty
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and the implementation of a set of social,
structural, and institutional reforms.
Guyana's completion point under the enhanced HIPC initiative paved the
way for the delivery of debt relief amounting to $358 million (U.S.) in NPV
terms from Guyana's multilateral and bilateral Paris Club creditors. The
amount of debt relief granted by Guyana's Paris Club creditors is particularly
noteworthy because it exceeded the amount of debt relief that the Paris Club
was required to deliver as part of the HIPC initiative by $24 million (U.S.) in
NPV terms and effectively meant a cancellation of nearly all Guyana's debt to
its bilateral creditors in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD).5
IT[. CREDITOR PARTICIPATION IN THE HIPC INITIATIVE

As noted above, the HIPC initiative is based on a proportional burdensharing approach whereby debt relief is delivered by creditors in accordance
with their share of the outstanding debt. This is consistent with the practice of
the Paris Club group of creditors, which requires debtor countries to seek debt
relief from all non-participating creditors on terms at least comparable to those
granted by the Paris Club. In practice, however, HIPC countries, including
Guyana, have found it difficult to convince so-called non-Paris Club creditors,
who include non-OECD bilateral creditors and commercial creditors, to deliver
debt relief.

" The sustainability of a country's debt is based either on the ratio of external debt to
exports or, for very open economies such as Guyana, on the ratio of external debt to government
revenue.
I See the Paris Club website at www.clubdeparis.org for details.
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In essence, the problem of creditor participation arises because creditors
that are not signatories to the agreements that form part of the IPC initiative
do not consider themselves bound by the terms of the agreement. The HIPC
Status of Implementation document states the following:
As regards to non-Paris club official bilateral and commercial
creditors, the current approach for securing debt relief relies
primarily on moral suasion by the Bretton Wood Institutions and
by the HIPCs themselves ... the debtors have the prime responsibility in maintaining a dialogue with their non-Paris Club official
bilateral and commercial creditors and seeking debt relief within
the framework of the enhanced HIPC Initiative.6
At the same time, until a settlement is reached whereby these creditors agree
to provide debt relief on comparable terms, Guyana and other HIPC countries
are bound by their commitments under the HIPC initiative not to service these
debts. As a result, several commercial creditors have resorted to litigation to
try to recover their claims in full. A survey by Debt Relief International (DRI)
revealed that in 2002, twelve HIPC countries were facing or had lost lawsuits
by creditors.! At the time, DRI estimated that judgements in favour of the
creditor had cost HIPC countries more than $400 million (U.S.), twenty
percent more than the total face value of the debt in question.
IV. ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS BETWEEN GUYANA AND THE

BIG FOOD GROUP
The origin of Big Food Group's claim against Guyana dates back to 1976
when Guyana's publicly held sugar company, the Guyana Sugar Corporation
(Guysuco) was nationalized, effectively ending the involvement of Booker
McConnell in the ownership of Guyana's sugar estates, which dated back to
1815. At the time of the nationalization, compensation to Booker was set at
approximately £13 million, to be repaid over twenty years at six percent
interest.
The debt was serviced according to schedule until 1989, at which point
Booker agreed to a deferral of payment following an agreement with the

" International Monetary Fund, Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative: Status
of Implementation, September 26, 2001, p. 20.
' Debt Relief International: HIPC Debt Strategy, Issue 13, 2002.
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administration of the late President Desmond Hoyte that the outstanding
amounts would be reinvested in a privatised Guysuco. The decision to
privatise Guysuco was reversed, however, by the administration of the late
President Cheddi Jagan, who announced plans to seek debt relief on the
outstanding amounts within the framework of Guyana's negotiations with the
Paris Club group of creditors. This proposal was rejected by Booker, who
argued that they were not party to either the general Paris Club agreement or
the associated bilateral agreement between Guyana and the United Kingdom
and thus not bound by the conditions therein. As a result, Big Food Group,
who by this time was the owner of the debt, filed a request for arbitration with
the International Court for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).
However, following a substantial media campaign by the Jubilee Debt
Campaign (JDC) and the World Development Movement (WDM), Big Food
Group chose to abandon its claim on March 17, 2003.
V. ISSUES RAISED BY THE GUYANA VS. BIG FOOD GRoUP LAWSUIT

As in other litigations involving HIPC countries, Guyana was unable to
settle its debt with Big Food Group without contravening its agreements with
the Bretton Woods institutions and, in particular, the comparability of
treatment clause in its agreement with the Paris Club, whereby Guyana
committed itself not to grant terms more favourable than those granted by the
Paris Club to any of its non-Paris Club bilateral or commercial creditors.
Thus, Guyana could not accede to the demands for repayment from the Booker
Group without prejudicing its application for debt relief under the HIPC
initiative.8 Conversely, a ruling by ICSID in favour of Big Food Group would
have forced Guyana to break its existing agreements with its Paris Club
creditors and would have potentially meant that debt relief already granted
could have been revoked.
In this particular arbitration, however, the situation was made more
interesting by the fact that ICSID, although autonomous, is also part of the
World Bank Group, which is, together with the IMF, the main proponent of the
HIPC initiative. Big Food Group had chosen to bring the case before ICSID
due to ICSID' s role as final arbitrator in investment disputes between firms in
Guyana and the United Kingdom under the terms of the 1989 Bilateral
Investment Treaty between the two countries. Thus, there was a very real
I Susanna Mitchell, Contradictions Within HIPC-ICSID Arbitration Sought Against
Guyana 2002, available at www.globalpolicy.org.
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possibility that the Government of Guyana would be forced by one of the
institutions in the World Bank into a settlement with Big Food Group, which
would contravene the equal burden-sharing approach of the World Bank's
HIPC initiative. This clearly constituted an unacceptable paradox within the
World Bank's operations.9
The arbitration between the Government of Guyana and Booker also raised
the more general issue about the enforceability of international agreements
such as those between Guyana and its Paris Club creditors. Within the current
framework, the only incentives for commercial creditors to share in the burden
of delivering debt relief is the potential adverse impact on their public
relations, as demonstrated by the successful campaign by pressure groups
towards Big Food Group. However, the aforementioned data collected by DRI
on lawsuits against HIPC countries by creditors indicates that, more often than
not, litigations against HIPC countries are resolved in favour of the creditor.
Thus far, there has been no talk of multilateral creditors and the Paris Club
withholding debt relief from developing countries that have been forced,
through lawsuits, to pay off their debts to commercial creditors in full.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the rationale for widespread debt relief is no
longer as compelling if this debt relief will be used to repay "rogue" commercial creditors as a result of lawsuits.
VI. CONCLUDING COMMENTS AND FUTURE OUTLOOK
This Comment does not intend to pass a negative judgement on the HIPC
initiative. In fact, to anybody that has actually observed the economic situation
in Guyana at close hand, it is clear that debt relief from the HIPC initiative has
been of vital importance for the country's public finances and, more importantly, for the incentives for the government to undertake often difficult, but
necessary, structural reforms. However, it is clear that the concerns about
creditor participation that have been discussed in this Comment, raise
important questions about how to design future comprehensive debt relief
operations.
In this regard, a number of organizations have tabled proposals for how to
restructure sovereign debt. These include, in particular, the Sovereign Debt
Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) proposed by the IMF (but rejected at the
2003 IMF Spring Meeting by the United States) and the Jubilee Framework
based on the United States Chapter 9 model of municipal insolvency. In
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addition, various collective action clauses (CACs) and contractual provisions
have been proposed that would facilitate collective action by creditors.
Common to both the proposal by the IMF and the Jubilee Movement are a
stay on lawsuits by creditors during insolvency procedures and obligatory
participation by (at least private) creditors in the arbitration proceedings.
Several issues remain, however, including the role of the IMF in the process
and the extent to which multilateral and bilateral creditors should be subject
to arbitration in the same way as private creditors. Hence, work to create a
satisfactory sovereign debt restructuring mechanism continues but raises hope
that in the future, efforts to ensure the sustainability of developing country debt
cannot be hijacked by "rogue" creditors.

